Abstract: Using a sample of banks, this study examines the capital market pricing implications of three components of loan fair values. We find that the nondiscretionary component is priced on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the discretionary component is assigned a significantly larger multiple than the nondiscretionary component and the noise component is not priced. This implies that the relevance and reliability of loan fair values differs across the three components. The larger multiple assigned to the discretionary component is predicted by a signaling motivation for discretionary behavior, consistent with the findings for allowance for loan losses. One cannot rule out the possibility that the estimated discretionary component is proxying for other value-relevant constructs that have a positive pricing implication. However, our results are robust to alternative specifications, including a levels and a changes formulation.
Differential pricing of discretionary, nondiscretionary and noise components of loan fair values
Introduction
Financial reporting for banks has undergone significant changes in recent years.
One of the most controversial and intensely debated reporting requirements is the disclosure of fair values of financial instruments mandated by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 107 (SFAS 107) . Critics of fair value reporting question the reliability of fair value estimates because of the inherent subjectivity in estimating the fair values of many of the banks' assets. At the heart of the controversy is the disclosure of loan fair values particularly because there is not a ready market for individual loans and hence, price quotes are not readily available for such loans. SFAS 107 allows considerable latitude in the determination of loan fair values. At a minimum, this can introduce "noise" into the estimation process and also provides an opportunity for discretionary reporting.
A distinctive feature of our research design is that we decompose the reported fair value of loans into three components: a nondiscretionary, a discretionary, and a noise component that reflects nonstrategic measurement error in loan fair values. 1 It is our hypothesis that: i) The nondiscretionary portion will be positively priced on approximately a dollar-for-dollar basis.
ii) The discretionary portion may be priced greater (less) than dollar-for-dollar if the capital markets perceive the discretionary 1 Such a decomposition is consistent with the suggestion by Wilson [1996] that 'we view accounting numbers as having three parts: (1) the measurement construct component, ….; (2) the measurement error,…; (3) the manipulation (or managed) component. ' behavior to be signaling (opportunistic). In the former, management provides a signal conveying private information about the value of loans or future firm profitability. By opportunistic, we mean management is disguising bad news about loan impairment.
iii) The noise component will not be priced. Our basic contention is that we can decompose the fair value of loans into three components, each of which will be priced differently from one another. Prior research has essentially partitioned reported amounts into two components, either nondiscretionary and discretionary (e.g., Wahlen [1994] , Beaver and Engel [1996] ) or nondiscretionary and noise (Barth [1991] , Choi, Collins and Johnson [1997] ).
The fair value of loans provides an opportunity for including both discretionary and noise components for two reasons. One, loan fair values are commonly characterized as being less reliable than loan values based on historical costs especially because of the subjectivity and judgment involved in estimating the fair values. While such subjectivity may lead to manipulation of loan fair values, much of the opposition to fair value by preparers of financial statements was not that subjectivity would lead to manipulation but rather it would lead to less reliable numbers (see Barth [1994] ). In other words, the nonstrategic noise component in loan fair values has been alleged to be material, which provides the motivation for the distinctive three component decomposition in this study.
We explore the pricing implications of the discretionary and noise components in fair values to shed light on the reliability of loan fair values. Even though reliability is not well defined, it can be argued that both discretionary behavior and "noise" constitute factors that reduce the reliability of loan fair values and hence, their value relevance.
Following prior research, initially we decompose loan fair values into only two components, nondiscretionary component and a residual component, which reflects the sum of discretionary and noise components. The nondiscretionary component is estimated using a set of informational variables that serve as proxies for changes in the loan portfolios' default and interest rate risks. Specifically, we use allowance for loan losses, nonperforming loans and interest gap measures to capture economic increments or impairments in loan values due to changes in risk factors.
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the nondiscretionary component is positively priced on approximately a dollar-for-dollar basis. We then examine a three component approach to loan fair values. In this analysis, in addition to modeling the nondiscretionary component we explicitly model the discretionary component of loan fair values, so that now the residual in a fair value prediction equation is interpreted as the nonstrategic measurement error (noise). We find that the cross sectional standard deviation of the estimated noise component is much larger than that of the discretionary component, consistent with potential reduction in the reliability of fair value estimates due to estimation error. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the noise (residual) component carries a zero price. While the coefficient on the discretionary component would depend upon the motivation for discretion, in estimating the discretionary component, we find that next year's net income is the dominating variable, which is consistent with a signaling motivation. Conditional on this finding, we would expect the discretionary component to be priced on more than a dollar-for-dollar basis. We find the discretionary component is positively priced on more than a dollar-for-dollar consistent with the predictions based on a signaling motivation. This result is robust to the inclusion of several control variables including the discretionary component of loan loss reserves, which is one of the more likely correlated omitted variables. Hence, banks use loan fair values, as well as loan loss reserves, as a signal of future earning power.
As we elaborate later, because we estimate components of loan fair values the results from the valuation implications of the components lend themselves to alternative interpretations. Notwithstanding, the fact remains that we identify and estimate three separate components of loan fair values, each of which is priced significantly different from one another. This is a nontrivial achievement given potential errors in our estimation procedures, since a random decomposition of loan fair values would produce no significant difference in the respective coefficients (see Guay, Kothari and Watts [1996] ). It also demonstrates that loan fair values are not taken at face value by capital markets, but contain three separate and identifiable components that are priced differently.
The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses our arguments for the differential pricing of fair value components. Section 3 presents the research method used to examine the pricing effects of loan fair value components. The sample selection procedure is described in Section 4. Section 5 develops a model for estimating the nondiscretionary component of loan fair values and presents the results of the pricing implications of that component.
Section 6 presents our main empirical findings on the explicit estimation and the pricing implications of all fair value components while Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
Motivation and hypothesis development

Differential pricing of fair value components
The question whether capital markets impound the information contained in disclosed and recognized amounts in the financial statements either completely or partially is a major research issue on which there is conflicting evidence. Hence, it is important to know whether disclosed amounts such as fair values are taken at face value by market participants in valuing equity or are decomposed based on an assessment of discretionary and noise components. Opportunistic motivations for discretionary behavior are likely to be affected by whether stock prices act as if capital markets are able to decompose fair values and price them differently. Evidence on whether capital market participants adjust for noise components in fair values brings to bear on concerns over the effects of lack of reliability of loan fair values.
Prior research documents the markets' ability to decompose the allowance for loan losses into discretionary and nondiscretionary components and to price them differently. However, it is not a forgone conclusion that capital markets will decompose loan fair values in determining equity values for several reasons. First, the capital markets have much less experience with loan fair values than with allowance for loan losses. Hence, the market may be in the process of learning about fair values. Second, loan fair values are supplemental footnote disclosures, not recognized amounts. The capital markets may not devote the same resources to decomposing disclosures as it does to reported amounts. Hence, findings from the decomposition of recognized amounts do not necessarily carry over to disclosures. Third, prior research on market efficiency with respect to accounting information is mixed. In particular, prior research documents that capital markets do not appear to fully process earnings information, both in terms of implications of current and past forecast errors Thomas [1989,1990] , Abarbanell and Bernard [1992] , and Ball and Bartov [1996] ) and also in terms of its accrual and cash flow components (Sloan [1996] ).
On the other hand, the counter argument is that capital markets would not be naïve in processing loan fair values. In fact, prior research documents that footnote disclosures (e.g., pensions, post-retirement benefits, nonperforming loans, and fair values of financial instruments themselves) are priced by the market and hence, at least partially reflected in prices. In particular, research by Barth, Beaver and Landsman [1996] and Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan [1996] finds that fair value disclosures have incremental explanatory power with respect to the market value of equity beyond that provided by book value of equity, although Nelson [1996] does not.
2 Hence, we contend that the ability of the capital markets to decompose loan fair values is an open issue in spite of prior research on allowance for loan losses and pricing of footnote information.
Moreover, no prior research has attempted to identify three components of a reported number and to assess the pricing multiple assigned to each of them.
Incentives for Discretionary Behavior
Given that footnote disclosures (e.g., pensions, post-retirement benefits, nonperforming loans, and fair values of financial instruments themselves) have been documented to be priced by the stock market, it is reasonable to assume that management may have incentives to manage such disclosures either to signal private information or for opportunistic reasons.
Flexibility in financial reporting offers an opportunity for management to convey private information to outside investors (Holthausen [1990] and Healy and Palepu [1993] ). However, the inherent subjectivity in reporting can also be an invitation for opportunistic behavior motivated by concerns over reducing regulatory costs, tax considerations, compensation contracts, debt covenants, and capital markets (e.g., managing the share price). For example, with respect to capital markets, managers may have incentives to exercise discretion if they perceive capital markets are unable to detect discretionary behavior in fair value disclosures.
Prior research documents that allowance for loan losses can be decomposed into its discretionary and nondiscretionary components and that the two components are differentially priced by the capital markets (e.g., Beaver and Engel [1996] ). 3 However, while loan fair values are analogous to allowance for loan losses, loan fair values are disclosed but not recognized like loan loss allowances. Many of the incentives for discretionary behavior are not present or at least are not as strong with respect to disclosed amounts as they are with respect to recognized amounts. In particular, there is no direct effect of fair values on taxes, regulatory costs, incentive structure, or debt covenants. Thus, it is relatively easier to isolate the capital market incentives for discretionary behavior.
From a signaling perspective, discretion affords management with an opportunity to convey private information about future firm prospects (Healy and Palepu [1993] ). To be credible, it must be more costly to provide a "false" signal than a "true" signal. There must be an incremental cost to misrepresentation. One potential cost is the legal liability for false and misleading disclosures. It is an empirical question as to whether the cost is sufficient to make the signal credible. Notwithstanding a strong prior for a signaling incentive, the inherent subjectivity in reporting can also be an invitation for opportunistic behavior motivated by capital market consideration (e.g., managing the share price). Also, recent work by Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas [1999] re-examine various incentives of managing loan loss provisions and find strong evidence for capital management but not for signaling especially for periods after 1990. Nissim [1999] concludes that banks manage loan fair values with a view to favorably affect the capital market's assessment of banks' risk and performance. The incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior would be premised not only on the value relevance of disclosures but also on the perception that capital markets are unable to detect the discretionary portion of fair values. As discussed earlier, prior research is mixed with respect to market efficiency in processing publicly available data.
In any event, in order for such behavior to be undertaken, the key feature is management's perception of market efficiency, which may not be solely conditioned on the findings of academic research. Discretionary behavior motivated by opportunistic motives leads to the prediction that the discretionary portion will be priced less than a dollar-for-dollar.
Noise component of fair values
In addition to the discretionary component, a third component of loan fair values is a nonstrategic measurement error component that we characterize as "noise". The FASB has identified relevance versus reliability as a major tradeoff in choosing among financial reporting alternatives. The fair value controversy is a classic illustration of such a tradeoff. Unfortunately, the concepts of relevance and reliability have not been as precisely or formally defined to uniquely map into a research design. Hence, it is left to the researcher to interpret how to apply those concepts in a particular context. Empirically, Barth [1994] addresses the issue of reliability of fair values in the context of fair value of investment securities and Choi, et al. [1997] 
Research design
We exploit a model based on the balance sheet identity to assess the market reactions to components of disclosed fair value estimates. Using the balance sheet identity specified in fair value terms, we have the following valuation equation: (1) as additional variables. 5 We estimate the following model: (see for e.g., Jennings [1990] ). This nondiscretionary component incorporates the original book value of loans adjusted for any changes in interest rate risk and default risk since the inception of the loans (refer equation (2d)).
5 The models used in estimating the components of loan fair values are described later. 6 If fair values are not measured with any error then the magnitude of coefficients b 1 through b 5 would be 1. However, we do not test such a restriction for two reasons: i) fair values are not available for all assets and liabilities, and ii) correlation among measurement errors in various fair value estimates.
The coefficients on the discretionary and noise component of fair values (i.e., b 6 , b 7 ) capture the incremental pricing effect of the respective component applied by the market. Because the total amount of loan fair value (LN FV ) is included in the regression, the net effect of the discretionary portion of loan value on price is determined by adding the coefficients b 6 and b 2 . Similarly, the net effect of the noise component is obtained by adding coefficients b 7 and b 2 . If capital market participants do not price the discretionary and noise components differently from the nondiscretionary component, then the coefficients b 6 and b 7 will be zero. In other words, if investors do not attempt to decompose the fair value of loans into its components (null hypothesis), the coefficient on b 6 and b 7 would be zero.
Under the alternative hypothesis (as discussed earlier), the incremental coefficient on the discretionary component (b 6 ) may be either positive or negative, depending on whether capital market participants perceive such discretion to be a signal of private information or a manifestation of opportunistic behavior. Because the noise component is expected to be "valuation neutral", we expect the incremental coefficient on the noise component (b 7 ) to be negative and approximately equal to − b 2 (i.e., b 2 + b 7 = 0).
The assumption underlying the predictions for coefficient b 6 and b 7 is that we can estimate the components of fair values accurately. If the estimates of discretionary and noise components are poor proxies, then any measurement error in one component will be correlated with the measurement error in the other components of fair values, by construction. Without a detailed specification of the error, it is difficult to predict the consequence of this measurement error on the coefficient estimates. However, if the model randomly decomposes fair values into its components, then b 6 and b 7 will be zero.
In that case, the value implications for all the three components are identical.
Sample and descriptive statistics
We obtain an initial sample of firms from the 1995 Annual Bank Compustat Tape for the period 1992 to 1995 that have total assets of over $150 million. 7 We hand-collect all fair value, loan maturity and nonperforming loan data from the annual reports/10-Ks.
Stock price data are obtained from the 1996 CRSP tape. Specifically, we obtain bank stock prices as at March 31 to allow for information in fair values to be incorporated. We retain only firms that have all information necessary to perform our analysis. We delete observations with extreme book values of equity (top and bottom 1%) and we are left with 945 firm year observations for our empirical analysis. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Note that all the variables are presented in scaled (by end of period net book value of equity) form. The average market to book ratio is 1.59, an unusually high ratio relative to earlier periods when the ratio was typically closer to 1 or below 1 (see Beaver and Engel [1996] ). This could be because of the unusually low interest rate environment during the period investigated relative to the late 80's. While the average loan fair value (7.24) is slightly lower than the average gross book value of loans (7.31), the average loan fair value is higher than the average book value of net loans (7.17) reflecting the declining interest rate environment. The descriptive statistics of all other variables are comparable to those obtained in prior research (see for example, Beaver and Engel [1996] ).
Decomposing components in loan fair values
At their inception, bank loans are typically priced to reflect the default risk and the interest environment during that period. Hence, the loan book value will generally equal the loan fair value at the origination of the loan. Subsequently, however, the market value of the loan may deviate from the initial loan value due to changes in both default and interest risks. Since the components specified in equation (2c) are not directly observable we estimate the three components as outlined below.
Estimating the discretionary and noise components of loan fair values
To estimate the discretionary and noise components in loan fair value amounts we examine the determinants of what causes the fair value of loans to differ from the unpaid original value (or gross book value) of loans. The "true" or "intrinsic" value of loans will reflect any change in the economic value of loans due to unexpected changes in interest rates and the default risk of the loan portfolio. Consequently, we use the following model that relates the changes in the value of loan since the loan's inception to various determinants of loan value changes, i.e., the effects of default risk and interest rate risk:
where ƒ is a linear function operator, NDLN FV-BV denotes the nondiscretionary component of fair to book difference in loan fair values, INT denotes the effect of interest rate risk, CR denotes the effect of credit risk.
Prior research (e.g., Beaver, Eger, Ryan and Wolfson [1989] ) uses loan loss reserves (LLR) and nonperforming loans (NPL) to capture loan impairment. Using loan loss reserves as a proxy for capturing changes in economic value of the loan portfolio due to changes in default risk assumes that there is no managerial discretion in determining loan loss reserves. However, research findings by Beaver and Engel [1996] and Wahlen [1994] suggest that the allowance for loan losses is subject to managerial manipulation.
To modify this assumption, we conduct a two-stage regression analysis. First, we estimate the following equation that defines allowance for loan losses as a function of net charge-offs (CO), gross book value of loans outstanding (LN BV ), and nonperforming loans (NPL) (see Beaver and Engel [1996] ):
where i and t are firm and time subscripts respectively. In the second stage, we use the predicted values from equation (5) that represents our estimate of the nondiscretionary portion of loan loss reserves (hereafter, NDLLR) as input for model (4). 9 To be consistent with the estimation of pricing equation (3), we estimate equation (5) after deflating all the variables by net book value of equity. δ 1 and δ 2 capture the extent of deterioration in quality of the loan portfolio. The amount of nonperforming loans represents that portion of the loan portfolio for which the likelihood of default is very high. Prior research by Beaver, et al. [1989] suggests that the supplemental disclosure on nonperforming loans is an important indicator of credit risk.
Therefore, δ 2 is expected to be positive. δ 1 captures the default risk inherent in rest of the loan portfolio, i.e., performing loans that have less exposure to credit risk than the 9 Research by Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1995] suggests that net charge-offs are also discretionary to the extent they are influenced by loan loss provisions. We conduct the Hausman [1978, 1983] test of endogeneity to examine whether any model misspecification is introduced by assuming exogeneity of net charge-offs. Similar to the findings in Beaver and Engel [1996] , we find no evidence of model misspecificiation. In addition, we also estimate equation (5) after including the amount of loan loss provisions and find that our inferences are unaltered. nonperforming loan portfolio. Hence, δ 1 is also expected to be positive but smaller in magnitude when compared to δ 2 . The accounting reconciliation of loan loss reserves between two periods is mechanically influenced by the amount of net charge-offs. Net charge-offs reduce the loss reserves on a dollar-for-dollar basis. However, the amount of current charge-offs may also provide information about future loan charge-offs and hence may be an additional indicator of default risk in loans. Therefore, the coefficient on net charge-offs (δ 3 ) may be either positive or negative.
Consistent with previous research by Beaver and Engel [1996] one might consider the residual from equation (5), η, as an estimate of the discretionary component of loan loss reserves. However, the residual, η, may also contain a noise component. Hence, we view η as our combined estimate of the discretionary and noise component of loan loss reserves.
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In the second stage we use the nondiscretionary component of loan loss reserves (NDLLR) estimated from equation (5) As before, we scale all the variables by net book value of equity. As with prior research (e.g., Beaver, et al. [1989] , Flannery and James [1984] ) we use fixed rate loans maturing beyond one year as our measure of long term fixed rate loans.
Consistent with the identity specified in equation (2c), the residual, ϕ, from equation (6) is taken as the combined estimate of the discretionary and noise components of loan fair value (i.e., DLN FV + NOISE FV ). At this juncture, we do not make a distinction between the discretionary and noise components, consistent with the two component approach of prior research. However, we relax this parsimonious representation shortly.
Recall that NDLLR and NPL are intended to capture the credit risk inherent in the loan portfolio. Considering these variables individually, we expect both coefficients, i.e., γ 1 and γ 2 , to be negative. However, because both variables are included to serve as proxies for credit risk in loans, either of these coefficients may deviate from the expectation. The coefficients on the maturity variable (γ 3 s) will depend on how the interest rates moved since the origination of the loans. That is, if interest rates increased (decreased) unexpectedly since the inception of loan then γ 3 would be expected to be negative (positive). Since the interest rates during 1992 and 1993 were significantly lower compared to late 80s and early 90s we expect γ 3,92 and γ 3,93 to be positive. Interest rates rose subsequently in 1994 and declined in 1995 and hence, we expect the coefficients γ 3,94 and γ 3,95 to be negative and positive, respectively.
Results
First stage analysis: Decomposing loan loss reserves
As orthogonality of discretionary and nondiscretionary components.
11 11 The advantage of pooled regression is that it neither constrains discretionary behavior to be zero across years for a bank nor constrains discretionary behavior to be zero across banks for each year. Since discretionary behavior may persist for periods longer than a year, constraining the discretionary behavior to be zero across banks for a given year may not be appropriate. Further, because of correlated effects of industry environment, banks in any given year may have similar incentives for discretionary behavior. Hence, we do not constrain discretionary behavior across banks for any given year to be zero.
The results of the loan loss reserve decomposition analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 2 . The coefficients on LN BV , NPL and CO are all statistically significant and consistent with results in Beaver and Engel [1996] . In particular, the coefficient on NPL is positive (δ 2 = 0.29, p < 0.01) consistent with the nondiscretionary portion of the reserve being determined partially as a proportion of the nonperforming loans. The coefficient on LN BV is also positive (δ 1 = 0.02, p < 0.01) consistent with nondiscretionary reserves determined also as a proportion of loans other than nonperforming loans. Also, the magnitude of δ 1 is smaller than the magnitude of δ 2 as predicted. The coefficient on the charge-offs variable (CO) is positive and significant, consistent with prior research findings. As indicated earlier, loan charge-offs mechanically affect the loan loss reserves by reducing the ending period loan loss reserves dollar-for-dollar. However, the positive coefficient (δ 3 = 0.33) obtained here is consistent with charge-offs conveying information about future charge-offs that, in turn, requires additional reserves to be provided for in the current period.
As noted earlier, the predicted values using the parameters estimated for equation (5) Table 2 . The means and standard deviations are comparable to those obtained by Beaver and Engel [1996] . As judged by the relative standard deviations, both are nontrivial components.
The standard deviation of the combined discretionary and noise component of loan loss reserve (0.059) is approxmiately 81% of that of the nondiscretionary component (0.073).
Second stage analysis: Determining the discretionary and noise components of loan fair values
In this stage we estimate equation (6) to determine the components in loan fair values. However, following prior research (i.e., two component approach), at this instance we estimate the combined discretionary and noise components, i.e., we take the residual from equation (6) as our combined estimate of discretionary and noise components. Recall that for this estimation we use the nondiscretionary portion of the loan loss reserve from the first stage (i.e., fitted values from equation (5)) as a measure of loan impairment. The results of estimating equation (6) are reported in Panel A of Table   3 . As with estimation procedure for equation (5), we estimate equation (6) Table 2 . As before, the mean residual (DLN FV + NOISE FV ) is essentially zero, by construction. The relatively high variability of the combined discretionary and noise component of LN FV suggests a significant variation in management discretion and/or noise and hence, a variation in the reliability of the fair value estimates.
Market value regressions: A two component approach
In this section we report results of the regression estimations that examine the valuation implications of components of loan fair values estimated from equation (6).
Specifically, we estimate equation (3) The results of estimating equation (3') are presented in Table 4 . As predicted and consistent with prior research, the coefficients on the fair values of assets and liabilities are respectively positive and negative both in the fixed effects estimation and yearly regressions. However, the magnitudes of coefficients are significantly different from one we make an effort to distinguish the valuation implication of the discretionary and noise components by explicitly estimating the discretionary component.
Explicit modeling of the discretionary component of loan fair values
Our analysis thus far models only the nondiscretionary component of loan fair values and the "residuals" were considered proxies for the combined discretionary and noise components. We use such a parsimonious setting because of the difficulty in modeling the array of conflicting motives for discretionary management behavior. In this section we use a specification that incorporates the explicit modeling of the discretionary component in loan fair values.
Specifically, we modify equation (6) * NI t+1 + γ 6 * SIZE). The residual w from equation (6') represents the effect of nonstrategic measurement error (NOISE FV ) in fair value estimation and the effect of any omitted nondiscretionary and discretionary variables.
Results of estimation of three components of loan fair values
We report the results of estimating the loan fair value equation (6') in Panel A of Table 5 . Evident from Panel A is that the coefficients on the nondiscretionary variables are consistent with the predictions and similar to that reported in Table 3 . We also estimate the correlation between the nondiscretionary component estimated from equation (6') and that estimated from equation (6). The correlation is 0.98. This increases our confidence that the nondiscretionary portion is relatively unaffected by the inclusion of discretionary variables.
One year ahead net income dominates the discretionary portion of the fair values.
The coefficient on one-year ahead net income is positive and statistically significant, consistent with a signaling interpretation. Conditional on this finding, we predict the coefficient on DLN FV to be positive in the valuation equation. The finding is also consistent with the prior research of Wahlen [1994] and Beaver and Engel [1996] with respect to recognized loan losses. The coefficient on CAPRAT is negative as predicted but not significant while the SIZE variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The descriptive statistics of the explicit estimates of discretionary and noise components of loan fair values are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . Judged by the relative standard deviation, the standard deviation of the noise component of loan fair values (0.14) is very high relative to that for the discretionary component (0.02). Moreover, the noise component of loan fair values is considerably higher than that for loan loss reserves (0.06, not tabled). This is consistent with concerns about the lack of reliability of loan fair values due to measurement error in estimating them.
Results of market value regression using the three components
In this section we report the results of estimating the market value regression (equation (3)) after including the separate discretionary and noise components of loan fair values. That is, we remove the restriction that b 6 = b 7 . If NOISE FV captures nonstrategic measurement error, the net valuation consequences of that component will be zero, i.e., the coefficient on NOISE FV (b 7 ) will be exactly the negative of the coefficient on LN FV .
The results of the market value regressions are presented in Panel C of Table 5 . The positive coefficient on DLN FV is consistent with a signaling interpretation.
One plausible explanation for the large magnitude on the DLN FV is that our explicit modeling of the discretionary component is misspecified or that DLN FV captures other valuation or omitted factors, such as current year's net income. We explore some of these factors below.
Robustness checks
We include several variables in the valuation equation to examine the robustness of the pricing coefficient on loan fair value components. First, we include the components of loan loss reserves as competing variables for the components of loan fair values. Previous research by Beaver and Engel [1996] finds that the market prices the discretionary component of allowance for loan losses (DLLR) differently after controlling for the total loan loss reserves (LLR). This result is consistent with stock prices behaving as if capital market participants decompose the loan loss reserves into its components and pricing them accordingly. Beaver and Engel [1996] offer a signaling interpretation for the pricing implication of discretionary component. 13 To be consistent, as with including the fair value components, we include DLLR, NOISE LLR and LLR as additional variables in the empirical specification. 14 This also helps us examine whether components of disclosed fair values provide incremental information beyond that in the discretionary component of recognized loan loss reserves.
13 Like Beaver and Engel [1996] , we modify equation (5) to explicitly estimate the discretionary component by considering several conditioning variables that capture discretionary behavior in loan loss reserves and treat the residual as the estimate of the noise component (NOISE LLR ).
14 In contrast to Beaver and Engel [1996] we need not necessarily include the total amount of loan loss reserves in the empirical specification because the nondiscretionary portion of loan loss reserves is implicitly embedded in the estimation of nondiscretionary portion of loan fair values (see equation (6)). However, to the extent that the information in loan loss reserves is not adequately captured through its coefficient on loan fair values via the second stage estimation (equation (6)) it may have an effect on the DLLR coefficient. Hence, we include LLR in the regression estimation. Nonetheless, we estimate the market value regression without the LLR variable and find no material differences in our regression results.
In addition, prior research by Barth, et al. [1996] and Venkatachalam [1996] report that nonperforming loans provide significant explanatory power incremental to SFAS 107 loan fair values in equity valuation. This finding suggests that loan fair values may not completely reflect default risk. Hence, the book value of nonperforming loans (NPL) is included to capture credit risk not already incorporated in loan fair values.
Finally, we also include the amount of net income before provision for loan losses (NI) as an additional variable to account for the effects of omitted assets.
15 Thus, the following empirical specification is estimated: Even though the specification in Beaver and Engel [1996] is significantly different from ours, both studies estimate DLLR conditional on the total amount of loss reserves. As a result, we also predict the coefficient on DLLR (b 9 ) to be positive.
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The coefficient on NPL, b 11 , is also difficult to predict because it is used as one of the exogenous variables in estimating both nondiscretionary loan loss reserves and nondiscretionary loan fair values. A negative coefficient would be predicted, if NPL conveys incremental information about default risk and the market applies an implicit discount on those amounts in addition to impounding credit risk information inherent in 15 As opposed to previous research we do not introduce positive net income and negative net income as separate variables because the number of loss observations for the entire period is only 8. 16 This empirical specification implicitly assumes that managers do not use any discretion in determining fair values of other assets and liabilities. We feel that this assumption is reasonable given the existence of a ready market for most other assets and liabilities. 17 The positive prediction for DLLR would also be consistent with Wahlen [1994] .
loan fair values. If nonperforming loans play no role beyond its conditioning role in determining nondiscretionary loan fair values, then b 11 will be zero.
The interpretation on the coefficient on the LLR variable is similar to that for the NPL variable. As with the NPL variable the effects of LLR are also essentially reflected in fair value of loans through the second stage estimation process (see equation (6) views the scale value of DLN FV to be the present value of future "excess" earnings beyond that implied by the nondiscretionary loan fair values. However, if that were the case, then in Table 5 we would expect the coefficient on next year's net income to be some multiple greater than one. However, the coefficient is considerably less than one (.183). Hence only a fraction of next year's net income is being measured as the discretionary portion. The net valuation consequence of the noise coefficient is still not statistically different from zero, as before (i.e., b 7 +b 2 = -0.892+0.827=-0.065). Thus, the differential pricing of loan fair value components is robust.
The coefficient on the discretionary portion of loan loss reserves (DLLR) is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 7.31, p < 0.01), consistent with the results in Beaver and Engel [1996] . In this study, the amount of nondiscretionary element of loan loss reserves is both explicitly included (through LLR) and implicitly embedded in the loan fair value amounts (LN FV ) through the second stage estimation. Furthermore, any relation in the discretionary behavior in loan loss reserves and loan fair values is also likely to influence the coefficient estimates. To examine the relation between the discretionary behavior in DLLR and the DLN FV variable, we estimate the correlation between the two variables. We find that the correlation (not tabled) is negative (-0.19) and statistically significant (p<0.01). This suggests that managers who tend to "overreserve" also tend to underestimate loan fair values and vice-versa. The market value specification in equation (3'') may still be incomplete due to omitted variables. For example, there are several intangible assets that influence share prices not included in the specification. Net income is designed to partially address this.
We consider one important intangible asset, viz., core-deposit intangibles that has been found in prior research to influence share prices. The results (unreported) Finally, to control for potential omitted variable problems inherent in levels analysis we estimate the valuation equation (3'') in changes form. We determine the changes in various components of loan fair values and loan loss reserves by using the change in the components used in estimating equation (3'') (see Table 6 ). The results presented in Table 7 reveal that the coefficient on change in loan fair values is lower than hat observed in the levels fomulation, but is still significantly positive (coefficient = 0.37). The coefficients on other fair value variables (i.e., SEC FV, , DEP FV , LTD FV ) in the change specification are of the predicted sign and statistically significant, but the magnitude of the coefficients are smaller than that observed in the levels specification.
The coefficient on the noise component is negative (-0.38) and significant and implies a net pricing of -0.01 (0.37-0.38), which is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on the change in discretionary component of loan fair values is positive (3.83) and statistically significant (p < 0.01), consistent with the earlier results. Thus, our results are robust to using the change specification.
Concluding remarks
In this study we examine the valuation implications of components of loan fair values. We decompose loan fair values into three components: nondiscretionary, discretionary and noise, each of which is priced differently. In particular, we find that the nondiscretionary component is priced dollar-for-dollar, the discretionary component is priced at more than a dollar-for-dollar, and the noise component is not priced at all.
Our study contributes to two streams of literature. First, it extends the literature that examines the valuation implications of management discretion in reported accruals.
In contrast to prior research that examines discretionary behavior in recognized numbers, viz., accruals or loan loss reserves, we examine management discretion in footnote disclosures, viz., fair value estimates for loans. Also, unlike loan loss reserves, loan fair values are alleged to have a material estimation error (noise) component in addition to the discretionary component. Our attempt to differentiate the noise component from the discretionary component in their pricing implications is a distinguishing feature of this study.
Next, it extends prior SFAS 107 research. Prior research examines whether the fair value of loans is value-relevant relative to the book value of loans. Tests of valuerelevance are interpreted as a test of the relevance and reliability of fair value estimates relative to book values. Our findings suggest that the relevance and reliability and hence, their valuation implications, differ among the three fair value components. Notably, the nondiscretionary portion is value-relevant and priced similarly to the fair value of other assets and liabilities, consistent with it being viewed as one with comparable reliability.
We interpret our finding that the discretionary component is priced more than a dollar-for-dollar as predicted by a signaling motivation. This is consistent with prior research on allowance for loan losses, which also demonstrates signaling behavior. = year dummy where when year is 1992 (i.e., t=92) YR 92 is set to 1, 0 otherwise. CAPRAT = book value of equity divided by total assets (both adjusted for loan loss reserves). NI = net income before provision for loan losses. SIZE = logarithm of total assets. Table 6 Fixed effects estimation of market value regressions determining the pricing effects of components of both loan fair values and loan loss reserves after controlling for net income. 
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